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In a post-crisis scenario, the global economy has entered into an episode of 
gradual recovery characterized, in part, by different growth velocities and 
capital flows to emerging market economies. This global environment has 
opened a debate relative to macroprudential regulation, financial stability 
and capital flows. In this paper I highlight the importance of this latest 
aspect, particularly in emerging economies where prudent macroeconomic 
and financial management have been crucial factors in promoting fiscal 
solvency and external equilibrium. Related to the banking system and 
financial stability, prudential regulation plays a central role. Gross capital 
flows are not exempt from funding and credit risks. Hence, the soundness of 
the banking system can be positively affected by a proper regulation focused 
on overall liquidity requirements and on avoiding currency mismatches. 
Therefore, authorities should focus financial regulation toward into this 
direction. In addition, the recent agreements of the Basel Committee on 
Banking Regulation are positive steps on strengthening the soundness of the 
banking system. However, there are still some risks to face, such as those 




Recent discussions on macro and financial policies have been dealing with the causes, 
consequences and implications of the financial crisis of late 2008 and early 2009, and the 
Great Recession that ensued. This panel has been persuasively entitled Where to from 
Here? 
 
I would like to focus on two issues: capital inflows, which is a very relevant issue for 
emerging market economies, and the recent agreement of the Basel Committee on 
Banking Regulation.  For this purpose I will start with a brief review of some facts 
regarding capital inflows. Then I will discuss the policy toolkit to deal with them. I will 
take a look from a macro perspective and then from the point of view of financial 
                                                 
 Presentation delivered at the Thirteen Annual International Banking Conference, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago, September 23-24. I am very grateful to Gabriel Aparici, Herman Bennett, Kevin Cowan and 
Pablo Garcia for very useful discussions and comments. 
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 stability. Finally I will make some comments on the Basel agreements, focusing on the 
Chilean banking system and its financial regulation framework. 
 
Some Evidence and Factors behind the Resumption of Inflows 
 
There is concern in emerging market economies about resuming capital inflows and the 
challenges they impose on monetary policy. I will first refer to some stylized facts and 
factors behind the recent surge in capital inflows, and then on the policy challenges. 
 
Monetary policy in the developed world has had to take on the burden of cyclical 
stimulus. Hence, policy interest rates in the main high-income economic zones have been 
kept low for longer than expected at the end of last year, and several central banks have 
actually reinforced traditional monetary policy with further unconventional measures. 
The discussion about exit strategies has morphed into further balance-sheet stimulus, and 
markets are pricing-in that monetary accommodation will continue well into 2011. 
 
In contrast to the situation in the largest developed economies, emerging markets and 
some financially-stable developed countries have transited to a quick recovery phase, 
which in some cases is leading to above-trend growth and the fast closure of output slack. 
Macroeconomic policy has responded accordingly, first through the normalization of 
extraordinary liquidity and financial stability measures, then by moderating their fiscal 
and monetary impulses. Interest rates in emerging economies have, therefore, started to 
increase and are, according to most expectations, slated to continue increasing over the 
course of the next few years. 
 
These monetary policy trends have naturally led to discussions regarding their 
implications for capital flows, current accounts, economic growth, and real exchange 
rates. In particular, some concerns have been voiced about the risk of returning to a 
situation much like the one observed in the mid 2000s, when low interest rates in the 
developed world boosted capital flows into emerging economies. With the purpose of 
increasing their liquidity safeguards and stabilizing real exchange rates, official reserves 
in emerging economies, accumulated through sterilized interventions, precluded current 
account adjustment, artificially boosting tradable sector growth. This led to global 
imbalances and, so the argument goes, facilitated (or even caused) global financial unrest. 
 
The above argument depends on whether capital inflows to emerging economies, which 
were indeed substantial in 2006-2008 (see Figure 1), are driven primarily by interest rate 
differentials or by medium term growth prospects. It is noteworthy to see how these 
interest rate differentials have evolved over time. Figure 2 plots (simple) average 
monetary policy rates for a group of developed and emerging economies, as well as 
Chile. It is striking that, whereas on average it stood at 440 basis points (bp) between 
January 2006 and July 2008, now it is barely 50bp lower (390bp). Intriguingly, market 
expectations for interest rate differentials hover between 400bp and 450bp over the next 
year. It would require substantial sensitiveness to interest rate differentials to make the 
argument that these are the main drivers of capital inflows. Moreover, the decade from 
1996 to 2005 witnessed an average differential above 1000bp, affected of course by risk 
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 premia, but still indicates that crude short-term interest rate differentials by themselves 
are not suggestive of substantial capital inflows. 
 
In terms of growth prospects, the picture is markedly different. Figure 3 presents IMF’s 
past data and forecasts for economic growth in developed and emerging economies. It is 
clear that, from 2000 to 2010, the growth differential between developed and emerging 
economies widened significantly, reaching around 5.5% between 2007 and 2010. Hence, 
the Great Recession did not affect significantly this growth differential, and prospects for 
the near term also indicate that growth in emerging economies will outpace growth in 
developed economies, but at a rate (4-4.5%) not that different from the average between 
2003 and 2005. 
 
A simple observation of the data therefore suggests that growth differentials are more 
important in driving capital inflows than interest rate differentials. The latter have 
remained quite stable for several years, and the main stylized fact of the past decade and 
a half has been a significant shrinkage of short term interest rates in emerging economies. 
A more suggestive interpretation of these broad medium-term trends is that high growth 
in emerging economies attracted capital inflows. Prudent macroeconomic management in 
emerging economies (especially compared to previous decades), allowed an improvement 
in external and fiscal solvency, alongside appreciation pressures. These factors helped 
implement lower interest rates. This different macroeconomic backdrop has also implied 
that today current account balances in emerging economies do not display the significant 
deficits observed in the run-up to crises during the 1980s or 1990s (Figure 4). The lack of 
a significant widening of the current account deficits should also indicate that current 
concerns about (net) capital flows into emerging economies could be premature, although 
for specific economies they could be posing more immediate policy challenges. 
 
Dealing with Capital Inflows 
 
Traditionally, the primary concern in emerging market economies about large capital 
inflows has been that they may be financing an unsustainable current account deficit that 
could derive in a sudden stop of capital inflows. A sudden stop scenario is particularly 
costly since it involves a painful restructuring of the economy from non-tradables to 
tradables and a large correction in the exchange rate with potentially large balance sheet 
effects, which could result in high volatility and output losses. This view regarding large 
capital inflows has largely been shaped by current account crises like the ones in Mexico 
and East Asia in the 1990s. As the evidence I showed, the current account in emerging 
market economies still displays, on average, a surplus.  Therefore, they do not currently 




In many experiences capital inflows have been exacerbated by policy actions. Most 
noteworthy are the attempts of authorities to defend an artificially weak currency. The 
expectations of an appreciation generated by this policy create further incentives for 
                                                 
1 Here I will discuss briefly the main tools from a macro point of view. For further discussion on these 
policy options, see De Gregorio (2010a).  
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 capital inflows. For this reason a flexible exchange rate should be the first line of defense. 
This is also consistent with providing the monetary authority independence to use 
monetary policy. However, and as I discuss below, this may not be enough to ensure 
macroeconomic stability. 
 
Monetary policy in the context of an inflation targeting regime also contributes to 
stability by leaning against the wind. Capital inflows that lead to an appreciation of the 
currency reduce inflationary pressures allowing for an interest rate cut. This, in turn, 
reduces incentives to capital inflows and takes pressure off the currency.  
 
This phenomenon has been recently experienced in Chile. In recent weeks, the peso has 
appreciated significantly. At the same time the economy has been showing a rapid 
expansion: despite the earthquake we suffered this year growth is expected to be between 
5 and 5.5% this year and between 5.5 and 6.5% next year. Although in our latest 
Monetary Policy Report we said that the bank will keep withdrawing the significant 
monetary stimulus, without the strengthening of the currency the withdrawal would 
certainly be faster. 
 
However, these macro policy actions may not be enough, in particular because capital 
inflows may be a source of bubbles in domestic asset prices. Indeed, in emerging markets 
bubbles normally take the form of an exchange rate appreciation. In this way, all assets 
become overpriced, not necessarily by higher prices in domestic currency, which may 
also be happening, but by increasing the value of the currency. 
 
A much debated issue in industrial countries has been whether tightening monetary 
policy could help burst a bubble in asset prices. Although, in general, I think that 
monetary policy should not target asset prices, nor should it be used as an instrument to 
deal with asset prices, the problem is more acute regarding capital inflows.  If capital 
inflows fuel a bubble in the exchange rate, tightening monetary policy will actually 
induce more capital inflows. Paradoxically, monetary policy loosening may help to 
stabilize the economy and lead to a slowdown in the rise in asset prices.
2 
 
Misalignments of the exchange rate, in particular in the context of massive inflows, may 
be the prelude of problems, in the extreme a currency or financial meltdown. For this 
reason other tools cannot be ruled out, in particular exchange rate intervention. To avoid 
the perils of introducing rigidities in the exchange rate regime, interventions should be 
truly exceptional and should not target a particular exchange rate value. Hence, the 
volatility of the exchange rate is not artificially lowered, and appreciation expectations 
are not introduced. If the currency is misaligned from fundamentals, the intervention may 
be successful in realigning the currency. If not, sterilized intervention will most likely be 
ineffective, and for this reason is important to have a strong presumption that the 
                                                 
2 For further discussion on the use of monetary policy to affect asset prices, in particular in the context of 
inflation targeting in open economies, see De Gregorio (2010b). 
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 currency has moved away from fundamentals before intervening.
3 In addition, foreign 
exchange intervention allows authorities to increase the international liquidity position of 
the economy so as to insure against a future curtailment of capital inflows.   
 
Naturally, a booming economy, with a widening current account deficit, persistent 
appreciation and low inflation may need some stabilization if the expansion is deemed to 
be unsustainable.  Fiscal policy could help, but unfortunately it is not always available, 
especially in countries with a weak fiscal history. Another tool, with weak evidence 
supporting its effectiveness, is capital controls.
4 Regardless of whether they are effective 
or not, they may hide policy distortions.  For example, policymakers thinking that capital 
controls are effective at insulating the economy from capital inflows, may tighten 
monetary policy to slowdown the expansion, but instead induce further inflows that look 
for loopholes to avoid the controls. For this reason I think that a more promising avenue 
is to look at the impact of capital inflows on financial stability.  Indeed, many of the 
booms in asset prices and activity that come with capital inflows are caused and 
amplified in the financial system. 
 
Capital Inflows and Financial Stability 
 
From the macro point of view, I have emphasized currency risks associated to capital 
inflows. A flexible exchange rate should help mitigate this risk. In addition, the 
development of the foreign exchange derivatives market should allow private agents to 
hedge against currency risk. In addition, capital inflows may be behind the development 
of bubbles in domestic asset prices, and there are also macro tools to deal with them. 
 
However, there are other risks that must be considered, which have implications on 
macro prudential regulation. Note that these risks may be relevant even when net capital 
flows are limited. Therefore, from the standpoint of financial stability, gross flows 
become relevant determinants of fragilities. These risks associated to capital inflows are: 
funding and credit risks. 
 
Regarding funding risk, large capital inflows in the form of short-term loans to local 
banks will tend to increase banks’ dependence on this external funding source, which has 
been shown to be a volatile source of funding. From the point of view of central banks, 
the accumulation of reserves may help mitigate the economy-wide consequences of this 
risk, but the soundness of the banking system must be safeguarded with the proper 
regulation. 
 
As for credit risk, large capital inflows in the form of loans to local banks and portfolio 
debt securities may translate into an increase in the credit supply as local intermediaries 
                                                 
3 In economies following inflation targets is important that the intervention be coherent with the inflation 
outlook to avoid undermining credibility. Intervention can also be part of unconventional policies to reach 
the inflation target when interest rates are close to the zero lower bound. 
4 The existing evidence for the case of Chile shows no significant effects on inflows or the real exchange 
rate, and limited effects on composition of inflows (Cowan and De Gregorio, 2007). See Ostry et al. (2010) 
for further discussion on capital controls and conditions for them to be used. 
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 and corporations access more elastic and often cheaper sources of funding (beside 
currency risk). This increase in the supply of credit in the local economy could fuel a 
credit boom, which in turn could translate into an excessive leveraging in the economy 
and an increase in banks’ credit risk. Furthermore, screening by external lenders may be 
more imperfect than local screening, which can lead to over-indebtedness of domestic 
corporations and to increased the credit risk of the local intermediaries that have already 
lent to these corporations. 
 
To address these risks, prudential regulation is needed.  In this regard, overall liquidity 
requirements, in particular those associated to foreign short-term funding, provision 
policies to address the credit risk associated with large capital inflows, and currency 
mismatch restrictions are key areas on which authorities should focus attention. 
  
To the extent that banks are the primary source of local financial intermediation, 
prudential regulation has the virtue that it targets the problem directly – i.e., it targets the 
financial intermediaries where the credit and funding risks are incubating. However, 
when designing regulation it must be considered that focusing on prudential regulation to 
the banking system can foster banking disintermediation in favor of less regulated 
financial intermediaries, which certainly goes against the spirit of macroprudential 
measures. Indeed, the global financial crisis has taught us the dangers of generating a 
parallel unregulated banking system and steps must be taken to limit this risky behavior 
must be taken, by enlarging the scope of regulation and limiting the extent of banking 
activities. 
 
An important aspect of this regulation is whether it should be adjusted according to the 
availability of capital inflows, or whether it should be time invariant. Let me share some 
thoughts with you on this issue. 
 
First of all, macro-prudential regulation should aim at reducing a risk build-up that could 
lead to episodes of systemic financial instability. It is not a counter-cyclical 
macroeconomic tool. Interest rate policy should be the main counter-cyclical tool for 
central banks. This being said, regulation should not introduce additional procyclicality 
into the financial system. In Chile, for example, provisions are done on the basis of 
expected losses during the life of the credit. This stops short of the Spanish dynamic 
provisioning rule, but reduces the procyclical impact of regulation, in particular 
compared to the method of constituting provisions according to actual losses. 
 
Second, although desirable in several aspects, it seems to me that financial stability (and 
the build-up of risks) is such a multidimensional concept that either hinders the 
possibility of rules based macro-prudential policy or limits it to certain aspects (for 
example, dynamic provisions), which must be supplemented with additional discretionary 
measures. This implies that central banks (or whoever is responsible for systemic 
stability) must either have the regulatory tools at their disposal, or must have the adequate 
channels to convey these risks to the institutions that do have regulatory discretion. In 
Chile, for example, although there is a separate bank Superintendency (SBIF), the Central 
Bank has regulatory authority over several aspects that relate to systemic financial 
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 stability. For banks, these relate with the authorization to use derivatives, regulation 
regarding market and liquidity risk, and others. In other areas, the Central Bank also has a 
say in “systemic” regulation such as overall limits for Pension Funds. This scheme 
accommodates recent policy concerns, since it avoids the conflict of interests that arises 
from mixing the micro supervisor with the monetary authority, while preserving an 
institution that provides a broad look at the stability of the financial system. This being 
said, however, there is a need to continue strengthening coordination instances with other 
regulators. In this sense I think that the establishment of a Financial Stability Committee, 
very much in line with the one established here in the United States, is a promising 
avenue to take.  
 
“Basel III” and the Chilean Banking System 
 
When discussing financial stability these days one cannot help thinking of the recent 
agreements of the Basel Committee on Banking Regulation, which are a positive step 
forward in strengthening the banking system. However, I would like to highlight that 
many emerging market economies already fulfill most of the requirements agreed upon 
for early 2019.  This is an important factor explaining why, contrary to many other 
experiences with international crises, the financial systems of emerging market 
economies were extremely resilient during the global financial crisis, and expansionary 
monetary policies have been very effective because of well functioning financial systems. 
I will illustrate these points with the case of Chile.  
 
Even though capital requirements in the Chilean banking industry still follow Basel I 
(only credit risk-weighted assets), it is possible to infer that the new BIS capital 
requirements do not appear restrictive. In fact, considering estimated capital charges due 
to market and operational risk, Tier 1 and Total Capital indicators are considerably above 
the BIS minima for 2019 (Table 1). This capital looseness allows for coverage of the 
conservation buffer and also the countercyclical buffer. 
 
As for common equity, more precision is needed. In its most acid definition, common 
equity corresponds to “paid-in capital”, which represents approximately 65% of Tier 1 
capital. In somewhat looser definitions, retained earnings may be accounted for as 
common equity, which in that case may capture as much as 70% of Tier 1 capital. Either 
way, implementing a limit on the common equity to risk-weighted assets (RWA) ratio 
should not represent severe restrictions. Additionally, the Tier 1 leverage ratio for the 
Chilean banking system is approximately 7%, more than twice the BIS preliminary 
suggestion. The healthy capital condition of the industry average is reflected at the 
individual bank level (Figure 5). 
 
No liquidity indicator was specified, but the introduction of such a minimum standard as 
of 2015 was agreed upon. Regardless, the Chilean regulatory framework for bank 
liquidity considers quantitative limits on maturity mismatches over 30- and 90-day 
periods in local and foreign currencies, which should provide a reasonable starting point 
for the application of further BIS requirements in the medium term. 
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 Despite a promising start, it is clear that there are still many aspects in which reform is 
still needed. Addressing the risks posed by systemically important institutions is one 
such area. It seems clear at this stage that systemic institutions should be subject to 
stricter supervision and regulation. Moreover, there is a lot of recent work on 
determining which institutions are truly “systemic.”
5 What I miss, however, is more 
discussion on regulation that directly limits the size of institutions. In Chile, for example, 
after a severe financial crisis in 1983 with close to 15% fall in output, a strong banking 
law was enacted, which has been improved over the years. There are several legal 
regulations designed to prevent or reduce the impact of financial distress in large 
financial institutions. In this field, one of the most important measures considered relates 
to operations and transactions that may lead a bank to obtain a significant market share. 
These operations require authorization by the SBIF which may also impose conditions to 
such authorizations.
6 For example, the SBIF may require that the effective net worth of 
the bank or banks involved be more than 8 and up to 14% of their risk-weighted assets; 
or demand that the limit of the loans granted by a bank to another financial institution be 




The challenges facing emerging market economies are different from those of industrial 
countries. While the latter struggle with ensuring a sustained recovery from the Great 
Recession, the former have to manage a healthy and vigorous process of growth, which is 
not exempt from tensions. The need of the world to rebalance saving-investment across 
countries will have as counterpart capital flows adjustments. Exchange rate flexibility, 
avoiding serious misalignments, should help to smooth this process. 
 
It is tempting to think that emerging economies did not suffer the financial crisis for 
having better regulatory framework than industrial ones.  However, the issue is somewhat 
more complicated. In some way, emerging markets enjoyed also less complexities and 
smaller sized financial systems. For the current level of development and the size of the 
financial system, regulations appear to have worked fine. But, the challenge is how to 
allow continued financial development in the context of a solid financial system. For this 
reason it is very important to learn from mistakes in more mature markets, and to 
participate and analyze coming changes in the global financial landscape.   
 
 
                                                 
5 See IMF (2010), chapter 2, and references contained in it, for a discussion of balance sheet and asset co-
movement approaches to determining systemic institutions. 
6 Actually, the SBIF may deny authorization to any bank merger, acquisition of assets of a bank by another 
banking entity, or taking control of two o more existing banks by the same person or group, or to increase 
substantially the existing control if the acquiring bank that performs said merger, acquisition or the 
resulting group of banks reaches a significant market share. In order to deny authorization, the SBIF needs 
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 Figure 1 
Net flows of investment funds to emerging economies
(billions of dollars accumulated in twelve moving months, weekly data)
(1) Global Emerging Markets (GEM).
(2) Middle East, Emerging Europe and Africa.
Source: Emerging Portfolio Fund Research.
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Monetary Policy Rates in the world (1)
(percent)
(1) The solid lines show the simple average of the reference rates of each group of countries. 
Dots are the averaged responses of analysts surveyed by Bloomberg during July 2010,
regarding expectations for September and December 2010, and March and June 2011.
(2) Includes Canada, Eurozone, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K. and U.S.
(3) Includes Brazil, Colombia, China, Czech Rep., Hungary, Mexico, Poland, Peru,  
South Africa, South Korea and Turkey.
(4) Data from before the nominalization of the reference rate (August 2001),
consider actual inflation. Subsequently, they consider the effective policy rate.  
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Above the bar: Percentage of total assets.
Source: SBIF, BCCh. June 2010
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Table 1: Current capital standing of the Chilean banking industry. 
 
Chile June 2010  Minimum ratios*  2019 
Credit risk only (Basel I)  Market and operational risk add on (Basel II) 
Tier 1  6.0%  10.1%  8.9% 
Conservation buffer (cb)  2.5%  -  - 
Total capital  8.0%  13.9%  12.4% 
Total capital + cb  10.5%  - - 
Countercyclical buffer  0-2.5%  -  - 
*As percentage of RWA. Source BCBS, BIS press release 35/2010, SBIF and BCCH. 
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